(1963). It does not include rigorous moral argumentation comparable to Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977). Also, it does not include, as it might have done, either a systematic historical survey or detailed comparative case studies. Nevertheless, Garrett provides competent and reasonable synopses of key elements of the issue, including moral evaluation, legal analysis, and historical commentary, combined within a consistent analytical framework. This book is a good place from which to begin serious evaluation of recent national and multilateral claims and proposals regarding humanitarian intervention.


Mark N. Katz, *George Mason University*

Many of the “great books” on revolution have been written by scholars who were primarily theorists and only secondarily (at best) area experts. These books usually begin with the exposition of a theory about revolution followed by three or more case studies that, the author claims, validate the theory. The principal criticism of this type of study is that the author has engaged in selective history, highlighting events or trends in the cases that support his or her theory and ignoring those that do not.

Fred Halliday does not do this. He is not only a theorist of revolution but also a genuine area expert on the Persian Gulf region, and he is cognizant of the literature on other regions as well. Instead of being organized around case studies, the chapters in this book examine various themes, such as the export of revolution, revolutionary foreign policy, counter-revolution, war and revolution, and the systemic constraints on revolutionary regimes.

An extraordinary knowledge of the history of modern revolutions allows Halliday to demonstrate the shortcomings of other theories. In response, for example, to the argument by Stephen Walt (*War and Revolution*, 1996) about how revolution in one country can lead to international war, Halliday demonstrates that causation often occurs in the opposite direction: International war often creates favorable conditions for successful revolution. In this and other instances, Halliday appears less interested in proving existing theories wrong than in pointing out cases they do not adequately explain and providing theorization that does account for them. Although the book is not organized around case studies, the discussion is replete with examples from a plethora of cases.

What does not emerge is a simple, overarching theory about the relationship between revolution and international relations. The author’s insistence on depicting the extraordinary variation in the many international dimensions of revolution prevents him from articulating one. Instead, Halliday identifies a set of problems that revolutionary regimes pose to the international system (and vice versa) and the patterns in which they are often (although not always) worked out.

For example, Halliday points out that some (but not all) new revolutionary regimes attempt to export their brand of revolution abroad—and usually fail. Some status quo powers (but not all) attempt to overthrow new revolutionary regimes; although they sometimes succeed, they usually fail. Some revolutionary regimes (but not all) attempt to separate from the international system and pursue an independent path to rapid economic development. This always fails, but whereas some revolutionary regimes have abandoned the effort relatively quickly, others pursue it doggedly for decades. In short, there are regular patterns in the way revolutionary regimes interact with the international system, but there are also significant variations.

One shortcoming of the book is that it focuses almost exclusively on relations between revolutionary states, on the one hand, and status quo powers, on the other. A more complete account of revolution and world politics would seek to explain the highly complicated relationship patterns among revolutionary actors—such as between revolutionary regimes, on the one hand, and both revolutionary movements and other revolutionary regimes espousing the same ideology, on the other, and between revolutionary actors espousing different ideologies. These latter relations are important to study; sometimes (as with the Sino-Soviet rift) they become so hostile that they induce revolutionary regimes to seek varying degrees of alliance with the status quo powers they formerly despised. (But, as Halliday would point out, this does not always occur.)

Halliday is well known for being, especially in his early career, sympathetic toward revolutionary causes. At times this sympathy may lead some to question his scholarly detachment. In some cases, for example, Halliday does see revolution in one country leading it to war with others (as Walt argues), but he (unlike Walt) insists that the status quo powers are primarily responsible. For the most part, however, Halliday is merciless in identifying the shortcomings of revolutionary regimes, especially in chapter 10, in which he analyzes the disastrous consequences of attempting to delink from the rest of the world.

On the whole, Halliday provides a masterful overview of a very broad subject. Although he may not present a simple, elegant theory about revolution and international relations, anyone seeking to articulate one must first grapple with the challenges to such a theory posed by this book.


William I. Robinson. *New Mexico State University*

Central America was in the spotlight of world attention from the 1970s into the 1990s and a major site of revolutionary challenge to international order. The appearance of guerrilla movements, the breakdown of the prevailing agro-export economic model, and the mounting civil strife in the 1970s ushered in a period of dramatic change. By the 1980s the region was engulfed in a general crisis: full-scale civil wars of revolutionary insurgency and U.S.-organized counterinsurgency, the collapse of the regional economy, and the demise of dictatorial forms of political authority. The 1979 Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and near revolution in El Salvador thrust the isthmus onto the center stage of a rekindled Cold War. No less dramatic in the late 1980s into the 1990s were the peace and demilitarization processes under the mediation of international organizations, transitions to polyarchy, and economic restabilization under a new model of free-market capitalism.

The Central American crisis has generated an extraordinary amount of rich scholarship, and William LeoGrande makes an important contribution with his study of U.S. involvement in the region during this remarkable period. Intervention in Central America during the 1980s, as LeoGrande observes, was a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy as it entered the critical transition period between the Vietnam War and the post–Cold War era. LeoGrande has